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Transcriber's Notes: This is a true copy of Col. Carrington's letter with the following exceptions: I have inserted apostrophes to show the possessive state as Col. Carrington did not and I have ended all abbreviations with a period where needed. All Transcriber's comments in the document are enclosed within brackets [ ] and all underlining is the same as in the original document.

Wallingford, Conn. Nov. 5, 1867

Hon. O. H. Browning
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir,

I have the honor to furnish statements which I deem proper to accompany Bvt. Maj. Powell's testimony, and trust that if his shall be printed, that these will follow them.

I am mortified that I have to meet such testimony, and more, for the Army, where I have some pride, than for myself.

Who is safe; and where shall honor be found, when Capt. Powell, can under oath make statements, the dis-proof [sic] of which is in his company desk if has kept his orders, and where it must come to light, after a time.

I am driven, where, respect for the Army, almost compels me to prefer charges against several and yet, I think from the pain and delay so involved, knowing how unscrupulous have been the agencies that have perpetuated the discredit of the Phil Kearney Massacre; and knowing also, that the post to which my Head Quarters are assigned is named in honor of Fetterman, who, though a gentleman, Every inch of him, was over-ruled by others, and, in spite of me, caused the Massacre.

I have shorn my statements, as to Bvt. Maj. Powell's testimony of all severity; and every officer and soldier will testify of their truth; while they who know him well, will see in his evidence only his accustomed slights of relation of past events.

He claimed to have commanded the 18th near Atlanta; and to have had entire charge of General [ ? ], books, papers and orders (then a soldier) but this time, it has been his misfortune to have borrowed un-earned [sic] laurels, under oath.

I do honestly pity his error; but I cannot refuse to contradict it, as I have heretofore [TN-tear in letter] his historical record, as he made it.

I am very truly, respectfully
Your Obt. Servt.

Henry B. Carrington
Col. 18th U. S. Infy.

In the Matter of Fort Philip Kearney Massacre.

Henry B. Carrington, Col. 18th U. S. Infantry, upon honor, as under oath, additional to evidence given before the Special Commission at Fort McPherson, and having read the testimony of Bvt. Maj. James Powell, furnishes the following facts, omitted by said Powell, to make his evidence truthful and complete.

1st.  Bvt. Major Powell, states, "That the discipline of the enlisted men to be "chaotic", owing to a want of proper support, officially and personally, by company commanders from the Commanding officer", meaning Col. Carrington, successor to Capt. Ten Eyck as Post Commander.

Remarks.  Col. Carrington personally superintended all important garrison details, nightly visited the sentries no matter who was officer of the day, and invariably supported his officers, each and all, who conformed to Order No. 38, before given in evidence, the regulations of the Army and the Rules and Articles of War. Order No. 38, was enforced, although not according to the acceptance of Brevet Maj. Powell and Capt. W. H. Bisbee and said order illustrated Col. Carrington's system in the government of men.

Bvt. Maj. Powell's exception to the detail of his Lieutenant (Mr. Grummond,) to command the Mounted Infantry, was over-ruled, as Capt. Powell alone had had a spare officer.  Capt. Powell's refusal to take up public property left by Lieut. Adair his predecessor, was over-ruled, Capt. Powell's application for return to his company, as infantry, of its [proportion?] of mounted men refused:  the last two items applying also to Co. A. Capt. Fetterman.

Officers were always [supported?], when they were humane and just, as well as exact, and conformed to the orders of the Commanding officer.  No others, complained of his discipline.  Striking, cursing and other such modes of brutal departure from Order No. 38, were not supported but reprehended , and Bvt. Maj. Powell's theory was most obnoxious to the spirit of the order, while another, when absent, boasted that "he broke out a soldier's teeth with the heel of his boot, out of pure respect for Carrington's discipline".  That officer had been the recipient of special compliments from his Colonel.

2nd.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "Mounted Infantry formed a detachment from the different Companies, which detachment had no direct or immediate commander."

Remarks.  When Bvt. Maj. Powell came to the post, Lieut. J. J. Adair commanded the Mounted infantry [sic].  Lieut. G. W. Grummond, formerly a field officer of volunteers, was assigned to relieve Adair in command of the Mounted Infantry and was detached from his Company (Powell's) by order received by Bvt. Maj. Powell.  The Mounted Infantry were organized and officered according to General Pope's orders, and as appears from Colonel Carrington's evidence, were mounted, at a time, when they composed (within twenty) all the men of the Battalion.  They were separately quartered, near their horses, and never were without a direct and immediate commander.  The desire of Bvt. Maj. Powell to have a full company, with a Lieutenant, above all others, was natural but does not explain a statement which he knew to be without foundation.

3rd.   Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "The paroled prisoners being without guard, seemed to exercise their pleasure, if such it could be called, of breaking into the Commissary and stealing provisions and also breaking into the sutler's store, which facts came under his official notice."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that the prisoners were not parolled [sic], until the day of the massacre to make all men available for some duty; also, that of four previously paroled, two, from the 5th U. S. Vols. were not under charges, and their regiment had been mustered out, and of the others, both experts, one as engineer and one as a sawyer at the mills, one came under the terms of the Executive pardon, the other, within a few days of it, and both men signally industrious and faithful; also, that no General Court Martial was ordered by the Department commander, although applied for, and that the commanding officer exercised his discretion without consulting Bvt. Maj. Powell.

Also; omits the fact, that neither of the paroled prisoners was ever charged with, or suspected of the theft referred to:

Also; omits the fact, that there was but one robbery at the sutler's, when the east store-room door was left open by the Carpenter, close by where the prisoners were under a tarpaulin, where they had to remain during erection of the guard house, and that then, there was no sign of "breaking in".

Also; omits the fact, that the Colonel first notified the sutler, and examined into the matter, and, that Bvt. Maj. Powell, neither, as officer of the day, or otherwize [sic], claimed to have detected the offenders neither did he, officially, or otherwise make them known to his commanding officer or prefer charges.

Also; omits the fact, that a special sentinel was always at the Commissary building, day and night, even in the severest weather; that, an extra sentinel was posted in cases of reported theft, that the Quarter Master Sergeant and clerk were sometimes required to sleep inside, with arms, ordered, "to shoot whoever attempted to enter", and that with the exception of a few cans of blackberries and some syrup, the thefts at the Commissary were small and rare.

Also; omits the fact, that Bvt. Maj. Powell, did not disclose the names of those trespassers, or afford the Commanding officer the opportunity to punish.

Also; omits the fact, that, with competent staff officers, and Captain Ten Eyck, senior to Bvt. Maj. Powell, he (Powell) could not be expected to know the plans or purposes of the Commanding officer, except as they related to his company, or duties; neither, did he.

4th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "The mounted detachment amused themselves principally with card playing, horse racing and getting drunk." and "the rest of the garrison performed their accustomed details in a very loose manner, viz, guard duties, fatigue duties in the Qr. M. and Com. Depts., and guard to wood trains."

Remarks, Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that when two officers playfully tested their horses on the plain before the fort, and the Colonel found that high betting took place, even among the enlisted men, an order was promptly issued forbidding all racing and betting; notwithstanding such action was deemed by some officers as an unwarrantable interference and affecting moral questions beyond the Colonel's control.

Also; omits the fact, that, that was the only show of a horse race; that, mounted Infantry never used their horses, except to go a few rods, to water, unless in pursuit of Indians, or on duty, as mail carriers or otherwize [sic].

Also; omits the fact, that card playing was never allowed men, on duty; and that, probably alone, of all officers, except the Chaplain, the Colonel never played, under any circumstances, even socially.

Also; omits the fact, that while there were a few incorrigibles, who would get drunk when they got liquor, the Colonel declined his (Maj. Powell's) request to transfer such to his company for application of the discipline he proposed, and that there was almost no liquor of any kind obtainable, soon after his arrival; since the hospital could only secure a half barrel at the sutler's when it became necessary to purchase for its use.

Also; omits the fact, that the Colonel arrested two officers, one day, for undue use of stimulants, even in extreme weather, and took occasion to reprimand such use in an order read at public parade.

Also; omits the fact, that, all half hours were called at night; that, often guards were changed half-hourly; that men could not, all, have two consecutive nights in bed; that all posts were carefully maintained and visited in all weather by the Colonel; and, that Captain Bisbee who was Post-Adjutant, nearly all the year, inspected and formed the guards, and made the Roster of duty, never reported that he was deficient, or otherwise made it apparent in the guard system enforced.

Also; omits the fact, that such was the system of preparation and watchfulness, that, at night, upon a false alarm purposely given by the Colonel, the whole garrison was dressed and formed in line by seven minutes, men dispatched to loop-holes and positions of defenses, [or readiness?]; and that, not only every company, but every citizen, and the sutler's clerks, had their written orders as to duty upon a general alarm, even as early as October, 1866.

5th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "There seemed to be a system of volunteering; Officers going out in charge of men, from the number of about forty to about sixty, which custom seemed to have been tolerated by the Post Commander."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that there was a standing order, dated as early as September 13th issued by Col. Carrington, then District Commander, and sometimes enforced by guards at the gates, forbidding officers, soldiers, or citizens to go out without orders from the Commanding officer.

Also, omits the fact, that a mounted detail was kept subject to the order of the quarter Master, who often had to go out to see about his herds; and also, the fact, that the Officer of the day was expected, at once, to act, upon a sudden alarm, so, that no time should be lost.

Also, omits the fact, that Bvt. Maj. Powell, did not participate in volunteering and that Capt. Ten Eyck, Lieut. Wands, Lieut. Adair, Lieut. Grummond, Lieut. Arnold, and (then,) Lieut. Brown, were the only Officers who ever volunteered a moment to pursue aggressive Indians, except the case of Capt. Fetterman Decr. 21st and his previous proposition referred to in report of Jany. 3 1867; and once when he accompanied the Colonel at his request.

Also, omits the fact, that when, on the 6th of December, in the field, I sent Captain Powell to bring out reinforcements and an ambulance, Lieut. Arnold came, in his place.

Also, omits the fact, that before his arrival at the post, the number of horses of mounted infantry had become reduced to thirty seven, some of which were always on mail duty, and that parties of forty or sixty, were neither available, nor sent out.

6th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell states, that; "Indians were seldom pursued exceeding eight or nine miles by cavalry and the detachment of infantry as a general thing; Lieut. H. S. Bingham usually being in charge of the cavalry and Capt. F. H. Brown in charge of the Mounted Infantry."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits to state, that twice, Lieut. Adair, then commanding the Mounted Infantry accompanied by Quartermaster Brown, pursued Indians for more than twenty miles; that, twice Col. Carrington went to Rock Creek and a fork of Goose Creek:  that several times Capt. Ten Eyck and Lieut. Wands, also made pursuit until late at night:  while all had instructions to avoid rash pursuit as [some of?] the first were of horses indicated that further pursuit would be fruitless.

Also, omits the fact, that soon after Lieut. Bingham arrived in November he was sent with half, or men, of his Company, ninety one miles to Fort C. F. Smith, to await November Post Returns, and left there Dec. 1st, arriving just in time to go out Dec. 6th when he lost his life:  and that Lieut. Bingham never did go from Fort Phil Kearney, more than once in pursuit of Indians.

Also, omits the fact, that Captain Brown never did Command the Mounted Infantry, but only such details, as, with his employees were assigned in the execution of his duties.

7th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that "The Indians were Cheyenne; that, between the 6th and 21st of December, no additional measures were adapted at the fort to provide against Indians; that, the line was less safe than when the post was established; that, on the 19th of December he had 140 men; that, the effective field force of the garrison was but 40 to a company; and that on that day he occupied a point, a mile and a half from the Pinery, inaccessible to horses, where he ordered the train to join him."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits to state, that Bridger and all messengers from the Crows stated that the Indians were not Cheyenne; while, he (Powell) never visited the Indians, or had any intercourse with them.

Also, omits to state, that, not only post levies but all the ox-teams of citizens were hired to complete the coral [sic; corral]; that, work on guard houses and hospital was prosecuted even on the Sabbath; and that the measures taken were so efficient that only the incidental losses of the campaign preceded that of Dec. 21st; that the new company went to the woods on the 20th for their timber and worked amid snow to hasten the work.

Also; omits, the Colonel's trip on the 20th December, the day after he now states he was threatened by 2,500 Indians, then reported by him, of from 300 to 500.

Also; omits to state that the line was less safe because of its first year of occupation of a hostile region.

Also; omits the fact, that there is no point in the range of Sullivant Hills, which the [timber] road follows to the Pinery, where ambulances have not safely carried ladies, or where mounted pickets and details have not been; therefore, accessible to horses.

Also; omits the fact, that there never was a time before December 20th, except Dec. 6th when one half of 140 men went forth under any command whatever to support a train, or attack Indians.

Also; omits the fact, that the increase of guard detail, December 20th 1866, was from the companies, his included.

8th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, makes certain statements as to the "Fort Phil Kearney", omitting items, which complete those statements.

Omits the fact that on the night of the 20th December the Colonel omitted, or suspended the train for the 21st and did not conclude to send one until quite late the next morning.

Omits the fact, that every night for months, the Colonel made out the bill of timber required to be hauled; received report of the wagons available, and so divided the bill as to secure the perfect system of all work without delay for timber, and that officers reported their respective claims to the Colonel for his action; so that the Colonel and Quarter Master alone had full knowledge of the plans in progress, and movement of the trains.

9.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "Col. Carrington commanding the post, ordered the guns of the garrison to be in readiness; that during that time he sent his Adjutant to Col. Fetterman telling him that he would furnish him a detail to go to the relief of the wood train."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that Col. Carrington assigned, him (Powell) to take Co. C, 2nd U. S. Cavalry, (which he, not Col. Carrington, then had in charge) and relieve the train; that, Fetterman then present, claimed the command, as Powell's senior; that, the Adjutant, did not detail Fetterman; that when Fetterman asked for his own Company it was given him, with Powell's, and that Powell at once went to his Company quarters to send the men to report to Fetterman, and did not complain of the substitution of another officer.

Also, omits the fact, that then, and there, Lieut. Grummond volunteered to take the cavalry, and did so, without remonstrance on the part of Powell.

10th.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, "saw Col. Carrington in conversation with Col. Fetterman, but observed that Col. Fetterman's command, in place of going to the relief of the wood train, filed to the right and went on the Big Horn road."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that Col. Carrington, crossed the parade and before the whole garrison, gave some instructions to the Cavalry as they then filed by the west flank of the post.

Also, omits the fact, that Col. Fetterman followed the usual course to the creek, but did not cross to the Big Horn road; but marched up the creek in the natural course to cut off Indians retreating from a train which could defend itself; but could not move to its work without an outside party.

11.  Bvt. Maj. Powell states, that, "I (he) endeavored to drive the Indians from the flanks and front, by shelling them, which I (Powell) succeeded in doing."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell omits the fact that only three case shot were sent; that, the fuses were cut, and the direction was given by the Colonel, while, he, with a few men assisted in handling the piece and moving it to the front, after recoil; also, that, publicly and repeatedly, he made the remark that "the last shot of the Colonel's, was as pretty as he ever saw."

12.  Bvt. Maj. Powell states, that, "he requested Col. Carrington to arm the civilian employees at the post, and at once send some persons to the relief of Col. Fetterman with ammunition and wagons; that Col. Carrington gave his consent to his request and asked his opinion &c – that he armed those men, had the wagons prepared, organized the detachment, consisting of employees and soldiers, Col. Carrington ordering Capt. Ten Eyck, to take command."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that nothing of the kind was done by him; and that, with Captain Ten Eyck, Col. Carrington inspected and organized the detachment, which was exclusively soldiers, Bvt. Maj. Powell not being present; that the Colonel directed him (Powell) to come to the magazine and help pass out and inspect arms which the Colonel was issuing; that these men had been gathered by an order sent through a messenger before the Col. left the look-out, and that Acting Master of Transportation Williams, reported to the Colonel, after hour [sic], for orders and took the men out to follow Ten Eyck, under the Colonel's orders, without conference with Bvt. Maj. Powell.

Also omits to state that the Colonel had the assembly called at the first firing, before he left his house, and all work, at once, was stopped.

Also, omits the fact, that Adjt Arnold, obtained reports from all companies as ordered by the Colonel, and reported to him in writing that at 12 o'clock M. there were then but 119 men left at the post; a copy being with Col. Carrington's evidence.

13.  Bvt. Maj. Powell gives statements as to conversations with his commanding officer as to his own place and duties, without stating whether he took Lieut. Grummond's sash, as officer of the day; assuming, that he was practically in command; omitting to state that any officer or company received orders from or through him, as none did except his own; and omitting to state that he took his proper place with his company at their distribution, as other officers did with theirs.

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, also, omits the fact that the Colonel's clock, was post time, placed by him in the Adjutant's tent; and that the messenger from Capt. Ten Eyck, was the Colonel's own orderly, sent out with the Captain and that he returned to the post a few minutes after one.

Also; omits the fact, that, the orderly reported directly to the Colonel at his house, received his written instructions and returned; that, Bvt. Maj. Powell never saw these instructions, now was he consulted about them; and his statement of their import does not agree with those sent, a copy of which, retained at the time, appear in Col. Carrington's evidence in chief [sic].

Also; omits the fact, that, Capt. Ten Eyck, left, within the shortest possible time after firing was heard, and had nearly reached the summit overlooking the scene of action when firing ceased.

14.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that "Col. Carrington told him that he thought he (Powell) had better take charge of the whole thing, or something to that effect; that he immediately did so, stopped all work and prepared the men for action."

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, Knows that published standing orders, held all men ready for action, at the Assembly, and that that, had brought the men to arms; but he may have carried in mind, the fact, that the Colonel ordered him to organize all unarmed men into permanent gun squads, and take charge of them to divide labor.

Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact that he placed the four guns [in] front of his Cabin, and [quartered?] the detachment in Mr. Grummond's house, next [to] his own, until the Colonel removed them.

Also, omits the fact, that when firing began, all men were required to stack arms, before quarters, and that the detachment sent with Capt. Ten Eyck, was made up, by verbal order of the Colonel, across the parade, without the delay of formal detail.

Also, omits the fact, that the Colonel did not know of "his many years experience among Indians", except from his own statements as to his antecedent life as an enlisted man in the army.

Also, omits the fact, that, shortly before, the Colonel had instructed himself, and Bvt. Col. Fetterman to make requisition, and had issued to each, 2000 rounds of ammunition, as, upon inspection, their companies seemed deficient.

15.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that Dr. Hines was sent out twice; but omits to state that he went but once, with the colonel's orderlies, and that they came back with Dr. Hines, just in time to accompany Captain Ten Eyck.

16.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states that, "It was nearly an hour after heavy firing was heard, before certain conversations were had with the Colonel, and during that time, no steps, to his knowledge, were taken to send relief:  but that half an hour after that, Capt. Ten Eyck left."

Remarks.  It was not more than an hour (hardly an hour) after the first shot, before Captain Ten Eyck sent back his messenger.  Twelve O'clock call sounded soon after the firing began, and no time was lost.  Captain Ten Eyck's men went on the run, so that they straggled, on the ascending slope, from the speed they made.

17.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "Nearly all this time the commanding officer was sitting on the top of his house, listening to the firing:  that Dr. Hines went out about nine o'clock and returned about half past ten o'clock; and he soon started out and returned about half past eleven."

Remarks.  The memorandum note sent to order the train to the woods was not sent to the master of transportation until after 9 a.m.  The train left about ten a. m. [and?] Fetterman left about 11 a.m.

Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits all orders given by the Colonel from the Lookout.

Also, omits, who "expressed fear about Fetterman when he started", though stating that they were entertained; while he says, after the firing he assured the Colonel that Fetterman was safe.

Also, omits mention of the fact, that the train went safely to the woods and cut its load; so that if Fetterman had been with it, or had simply crossed the line of retreating Indians, all the anxiety expressed would have been superfluous.

18.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "Col. Carrington certainly saw him throw a shell", not indicating why he doubted the Colonel's recollection.

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits to state, that the time he was throwing shell, was some days after, when, at the Colonel's order, he practiced his squads, in ranges, three rounds to the piece, and that on the 21st of December he did nothing of the kind.

19.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that, "There were thirty (30) bodies brought in on the night of December 21st."

Remarks.   Bvt. Maj. Powell omits the fact that the Commanding officer was equally desirous with him to recognize the dead, though he did not see him (Powell) when the bodies were unloaded.  Bvt. Major Powell would naturally search for Fetterman who built and occupied quarters with him, who occupied the next room, and went in his place; but, in fact, forty nine bodies were counted by the Colonel, Capt. Ten Eyck and Surgeon Horton, instead of thirty as estimated by Bvt. Maj. Powell.

Also, omits the fact that Capt. Ten Eyck was his senior, and that the arrangements made, were under the charge of Capt. Ten Eyck, with the approval of the Colonel.

20.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, having omitted all allusion to the personal labors of his commanding officer does incidentally confirm Colonel Carrington's report of Jan. 3, 1867 in many particulars, especially as to [the] hostility of the Indians; and, at the date of July 24th 1867, states that no expeditions had been undertaken, while omitting the fact that five fresh companies re-enforced Fort Phil Kearney, in January, 1867, six months previous.

21.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, states, that Col. Carrington, Capt. Ten Eyck, and Lt. Matson, with eighty or ninety men went out for the remaining bodies.

Remarks.  Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that at an interview of all the officers with the Colonel, on the morning of the 22nd December, he pronounced it unsafe to venture their rescue, and that Col. Carrington immediately after, made his detail and led the party, returning after night with all the bodies.

Bvt. Maj. Powell, omits the fact, that at the same interview he recommended abandonment of the stockade, and that each company officer, should, upon an attack resort to his separate company quarters and there fire upon the foe.  This plan left the magazine in the public square, abandoned Hospital, warehouses and family quarters, gave the loop-holes to the Indians and left uncertain the effect of fire from four buildings, facing each other, two and two, with magazine between.

Also, omits the fact, that Bvt. Maj. Powell continued his Company duties with as much apparent subserviency [sic] to the will and suggestion of his Colonel as any officer of the post.

Bvt. Maj. Powell arrived Nov. 5, 1866.  Until he otherwise arranged his mess, he was a guest at his Colonel's table.  From that time he never entered the house upon invitation, or at his own prompting, socially; and did not even call to say good bye when the family started in a snow storm upon a winter's trip of uncertain risk and exposure.  He attended one officer's meeting, (referred to) and called, in his turn, at the [time?], for instructions when officer of the day.  He was never consulted, except as circumstances made it natural in the routine of duty, and, his belief that the post was in imminent peril, was not shared by the Colonel, though the contingency of a sharp struggle was prepared for.

Colonel Carrington had no prejudice, but had telegraphed to have Powell and Fetterman sent to him.

His illiterateness [sic] and coarse profanity were overlooked, because of his antecedents, and those mistakes which made mirth for other men, were never repeated, or harshly judged by his Colonel.

His statements as to previous campaigns were treated as an innocent self-indulgence not to be contradicted; but his assumptions as the Phil Kearney Massacre require additional explanation as they affect other character than his; and strike at that vital principle of Army life, without which, it combines the meanest despotism and the most abject slavery.

The testimony of Bvt. Maj. Powell was taken by on of the Commission after the six members, together, had considered sufficient testimony secured; and after they had declined taking the testimony of several, (as referred to in Col. Carrington's testimony) who were at Fort McPherson, where the Commission remained over a month.

The Commission did not afford Col. Carrington access to other testimony; but the Report of January 3rd will be found to be the true version of the Phil Kearney Massacre.

That report was read to Captain Ten Eyck, Lieut. Matson, Lieut. Wands, Lieut. Arnold, Surgeon Horton, Dr. Hines and others at the time, with view to perfect accuracy and was regarded correctly [by] them all.

Bvt. Brig. Genl. Wessels made a report, as well as partial examination, soon after, under the order of Bvt. Maj. Genl. Cooke, confirming the same.

Nearly one year after the massacre, it will be found that the acceptance of Colonel Carrington's report, in the usual way, would have spared him much public obliquy [sic] and would have given facts as to Indian affairs which nearly a year has not fully unfolded.

Henry B. Carrington
Col. 18th U. S. Infy.